This spring, a very public spat took place between the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and his first cousin, Rami Makhlouf, a billionaire businessman whose corruption and wealth symbolize, for many Syrians, the regime’s evils. Makhlouf, now out of favor, also played a major role in cementing his country’s alliance with Iran, which has been crucial in preserving the Assad clan’s rule in the face of the nine-year civil war. By contrast, Russia—Damascus’s other key ally—has had repeated squabbles with Makhlouf. For these reasons, argue Eran Lerman, Aiman Mansour, and Micky Aharonson, there are political and diplomatic consequences to the feud that could open strategic opportunities to the U.S. and Israel:
The benefits [to Assad] of Iranian involvement in Syria are steadily diminishing, as the civil war becomes less intense, and as the ultimate outcome in the Idlib province, [a northwestern territory that, thanks to Ankara, is the last redoubt of rebel forces], is determined more by Turkish-Russian understandings than military action by Iranian forces and their allied militias, led by Hizballah.
The flow of funds from Iran to Syria has also dwindled due to Iran’s extreme economic distress, caused by American sanctions compounded by the collapse of energy prices. It was Russia, rather than Iran, that undertook to support Assad’s war effort in Idlib, and Russia now sponsors the fragile arrangements reached with Turkey that have reduced the level of violence for the time being.
Meanwhile, the cost of the Iranian presence has been rising steadily, largely due to Israeli operations—the so-called “campaign between the wars.” Israeli Airforce strikes have taken a toll on the lives, limbs, and infrastructure of Iran and its proxies, and also have battered Syrian security and prestige. Over time, it has become clear to the regime that Iran’s ultimate purposes in Syria are starkly different, in terms of the confrontation with Israel, from those of Bashar and his family.
Assad is a bloody dictator. But since a strategic confrontation with Iran may be lying ahead, something that overshadows all other U.S. and Israeli considerations, priority should be given to options that will deny Iran the capacity to use Syria as a base for bleeding Israel.
Of course, the three explain, the interests of Damascus and Moscow are still diametrically opposed to those of Jerusalem and Washington. But there might nonetheless be an opportunity to encourage Putin and Assad, at the very least, to diminish the Iranian presence in Syria.
Read more on Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security: https://jiss.org.il/en/lerman-mansour-ahronson-tensions-between-assad-and-iran-present-an-opportunity-in-syria/