In the last two weeks, Hamas has resumed terrorizing southwestern Israel, using explosives carried by kites and balloons as well as rocket fire—and thus causing severe forest fires in the area. The IDF has responded with airstrikes. Elior Levy examines the situation:

In recent days, Hamas has been under pressure from Qatar, Egypt, and the UN’s special coordinator for the Middle East peace process Nickolay Mladenov. . . . But for now the organization is adamant in continuing on its current course of sending incendiary balloons into Israel, while reiterating that any Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip will be answered with counter-attacks in the form of rocket fire or other offensive activities.

Hamas is also currently dealing with pressure from within as a result of the shortage of fuel within the Strip, which has led to Gaza’s power plant ceasing operations. . . . The electricity crisis, the discontinuation of infrastructure projects in the Strip, and Hamas’s assumption that Israel will wish to avoid another campaign against the organization in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, has led Hamas to stand firm in its demands.

It seems that Israel is still giving mediators a chance to bring about renewed calm while also trying to avoid violent escalation. Nonetheless, Jerusalem is determined not to let this recent bout of escalation turn into a war of attrition.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.