So Long as France Continues to Appease Hizballah, It Won’t Stabilize Lebanon

On September 1, the French president Emmanuel Macron visited Lebanon for the second time since the August 4 explosion at the Beirut port. He did so—in keeping with his country’s longstanding involvement in Lebanese affairs—to help restore stability in Lebanon and to assist it in recovering from the catastrophe. But these efforts will fail, writes Tsilla Herscho, until Macron takes a harder line against the Iran-backed terrorist group Hizballah and its efforts to transform the Levantine nation into a launching pad for attacks on Israel:

President Macron is friendlier toward Israel than were his predecessors. [Yet] Macron has continued France’s tradition of appeasing Hizballah. For instance, following the discovery in December 2018 and January 2019 of six terrorist attack tunnels built by Hezbollah that reached deep into Israel’s northern territory, . . . France condemned the digging of the tunnels and recognized it as a violation [of a UN resolution], but maintained its traditional posture as an “impartial mediator” and yet again called for Israeli restraint.

France’s policy of appeasement . . . has the unfortunate result of encouraging rather than discouraging Hizballah to pursue terrorist activities against Israel. This undermines any chance of achieving stability for Lebanon, and it works to the advantage of Hizballah’s Iranian patron.

Another central problem with France’s policy toward Hizballah is its continued opposition to the designation of Hizballah’s political wing as a terrorist organization. France has so far prevented EU member states’ attempts to make this designation and impose sanctions accordingly, as the EU has done with Hizballah’s military wing. . . . Moreover, France continues to promote the unrealistic illusion that Hizballah will at some point be disarmed, either by Lebanon’s army or by its political institutions. This mission is impossible to accomplish, as both are completely controlled by Hizballah.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Emmanuel Macron, Hizballah, Israeli Security, Lebanon

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF