Last week, Serbia and Kosovo agreed to establish normal economic relations—a major step toward bringing an end to the conflicts following the fall of Yugoslavia that caused so much bloodshed in the 1990s. Kosovo, historically a region of Serbia with a predominantly Albanian-speaking and Muslim population, declared independence from Orthodox Christian-dominated Serbia in 2008, but has yet to be recognized by many countries. As a corollary to the U.S.-brokered agreement, Israel will establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo, and both Kosovo and Serbia will establish embassies in Jerusalem. Lahav Harkov comments:

Kosovo offered to open an embassy in Jerusalem in exchange for recognition in 2018, but Israel’s official position was that it did not want to risk its strong relationship with Serbia, although plenty of countries that recognize Kosovo still have good ties with Belgrade. The bigger reason why Israel was wary of ties with Kosovo was its concern over setting a precedent for the Palestinians.

Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, and for Israel to support them doing so could be seen as [setting a precedent for recognition of] a Palestinian state. Officially, the Palestinian Authority does not recognize Kosovo.

What changed on Friday that made Israel give up on this principled position? Call it diplomatic realism. . . . Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu . . . is giving up on a theoretical benefit—not sending the wrong message—for something Israel wants now: two more embassies in Jerusalem, including the first from a Muslim-majority country.

As for the Palestinians, they have, as Harkov notes, already taken steps to be recognized as an independent state by international organizations. What they have not done, however, is what the Kosavars have been doing for well over a decade: building the institutions that make for an actual state.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.