Tomorrow, American-mediated talks are set to begin between Beirut and Jerusalem over the precise location of the border between the two countries’ coastal waters. The two states are legally at war, as Lebanon declared war on the nascent Jewish state in 1948, and, although it signed an armistice agreement a year later, a formal peace has never been concluded. But the presence of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean has given Lebanon an impetus to resolve the dispute over the maritime border. Alan Baker writes:

Regrettably, Lebanon’s refusal [for the past 30 years] to enter into a direct negotiations with Israel has prevented any possibility of resolving the issue by . . . peaceful means, despite the fact that bilateral maritime border delimitation agreements in the Mediterranean Sea have been signed between Cyprus and Lebanon in 2007, and between Cyprus and Israel in 2010, and despite a series of attempts to solve the dispute through indirect talks between Israel and Lebanon between 2011 and 2012.

It is precisely this departure that makes the negotiations a milestone, regardless of their outcome. Baker continues:

A further significant factor rendering the upcoming negotiation with Lebanon unique is the fact that it comes on the heels of the September 15, 2020, Abraham Accords, signed in Washington by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the kingdom of Bahrain, and the U.S. The signing of these accords, in and of itself, heralds a new era of acceptance, recognition, and developing normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world, which cannot go unnoticed by Lebanon as it enters into a new, and hopefully more successful negotiation process with Israel on their joint maritime border.

As Baker notes, the president of the Lebanese parliament, himself a Shiite Muslim, has for the first time begun referring to Israel without using the word “enemy”—another sign that the winds of change blowing through the Middle East have touched Lebanon as well.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.