Next month, Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, will turn eighty-five. Abbas, currently in the sixteenth year of his four-year term, is a heavy smoker, reportedly in poor health, and has made no arrangements for a successor. Among those senior members of his ruling Fatah party who are vying to position themselves to assume his post in the event of his death is Jibril Rajoub—whom Michael Milstein believes is most likely to triumph in the succession struggle:

Rajoub is solidifying his position by inciting against Israel, calling for the nullification of all agreements, advancing the peace talks between the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Hamas terrorist organization, and promoting a model of “popular resistance”—fighting against Israel mainly with rioting and civil unrest. This strategy, Rajoub insists, will facilitate cooperation with Fatah’s long-time rival Hamas and will be received with understanding and even sympathy in the international arena.

Israel must remain vigilant and cautious, and refrain from acting as a kingmaker by dabbling in internal Palestinian politics, which it has done before to disastrous results.

[Instead], Israel should . . . first, use every possible channel—secretly through external mediators and [openly] via the media—to make the situation clear to Rajoub himself and to the upper echelons of the PA, and to the Palestinian public. They must understand what will come to pass if Rajoub’s inciteful slogans are indeed translated into action.

Secondly—and more importantly—Israel must work to help end the acute crisis within the PA that began on May 19, [when Abbas formally renounce security cooperation with the IDF], which acts as a fertile ground for extremist ideas and actions.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.