In recent weeks, the Knesset member Mansour Abbas, the leader of the religiously conservative Islamic party Ra’am, has drawn increasingly close to Likud—to the ire of his colleagues in the Joint Arab List, a bloc consisting of several Arab parties. His actions and statements represent a dramatic rejection of the traditional Arab political attitude of permanent opposition to whichever party is in power. Criticizing those Israelis who would see this development through the narrow lens of their distaste for Benjamin Netanyahu, Michael Milshtein praises Abbas for his “principled” approach:

Abbas himself makes it clear that after many years of adhering to the slogans [that dominate Israeli Arab politics] and a genuine unwillingness to cross the line when it comes to [cooperating with the] government, he is willing to break conventions to [improve the lot] of Arab Israelis. . . . Abbas is not alone in this and in recent months similar comments of cooperation have been heard from other opinion makers. They are expressing the prevailing mood of an Arab public frustrated by the fact that its unprecedented electoral achievements in recent years have not swayed the Joint List out of its refusal to become more involved in governance.

Abbas is to a large extent a revolutionary. He has broken out of the pattern of identity politics, which automatically puts all Arabs on the same side of the political map and in the pockets of the leftist camp.

In terms of its political approach, [Ra’am] is similar to the other Arab parties, but socially and ideologically it is closer to the [Jewish] religious parties, which is reflected in the party’s opposition to the ban on “conversion therapies” [for homosexuals], a position that caused a stir among the Arab public.

The ball is currently in the court of Jewish politics and society. Now the Jewish side must also show an ability to change, and especially its willingness to open the gates of the major parties and coalitions to those who approach from the heart of Arab society.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.