Because Sudan is currently ruled by a transitional government as it recovers from many years of Islamist dictatorship, there is reason to doubt the longevity of any action taken in Khartoum, the recent normalization with Israel included. But, argue Orde Kittrie and Varsha Koduvayur, the U.S. can help preserve the fragile peace agreement by assisting Sudan as it moves toward democracy, and by aiding its overall stability. They write:

Abdelfattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s military council and the country’s de-facto head of state, said key steps in enhancing relations with Israel will be delayed until they are submitted for approval by a legislative council that has not yet been established. Meanwhile, three Sudanese political parties responded to the joint statement by threatening to withdraw from the coalition backing Sudan’s transitional government.

Unless appropriately bolstered, progress towards Sudan-Israel peace risks stalling or worse. History shows that steps towards peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors can collapse in the absence of sufficient traction. Israel and Lebanon signed a peace agreement in 1983, but Lebanon canceled it a year later. Four other Arab states each at one time had, but then canceled, formal economic or other less-than-full diplomatic relations with Israel—Morocco (1994-2000), Oman (1996-2000), Qatar (1996-2000), and Tunisia (1996-2000).

The extent to which stable Sudanese democracy and comprehensive, lasting Sudan-Israel peace result from the recent U.S.-Sudan rapprochement depends heavily on next steps by Washington to implement two still-pending elements of the multipart agreement it reached with Khartoum in October.

As this process unfolds, Washington may need to be patient with Sudan and to keep Khartoum’s limits in mind. Each additional improved relationship between Israel and an Arab country, including Sudan, is good for the United States and the region. But a cautionary lesson is provided by the five prior Israeli rapprochements . . . which collapsed absent sufficient traction. The current enthusiastic embrace of peace with Israel by the UAE and Bahrain will be much more encouraging to other Arab states if it is not accompanied by a collapsed process involving a weakened Sudanese government giving in to protestors.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.