After discovering explosives planted along the Israeli-Syrian border, the IDF on Wednesday morning struck a joint Syrian and Iranian military headquarters near Damascus. Ron Ben-Yishai places the attacks in the context of Tehran’s efforts to turn Syria into a base for attacking the Jewish state:

A new strategic challenge has surfaced in Syria following a recently signed agreement between Tehran and Damascus, which will allow Iran to transfer state-of-the-art air defense designed to combat Israeli aerial attacks. This agreement is evidence of a new phase in Iran’s presence in Syria, with increased shipments of anti-aircraft and missile systems to Syria—most of which are Russian-made or acquired from Moscow—meant to bolsters Bashar al-Assad’s air defenses.

Tehran also threatened to send advanced surface-to-air missiles to Syria, the same ones that shot down an American drone over the Persian Gulf in 2019. There were several attempts to deliver these systems, but according to foreign reports they were always thwarted by the Israel Air Force upon arrival in Syria.

It can be assumed that the installations attacked early Wednesday by the IDF were part of this effort, with Israel sending a clear message that it will not allow Iran to bolster Syria’s anti-air apparatuses with Russian-made equipment.

On September 16 and 17, the IDF carried out airstrikes in the vicinity of Damascus, reportedly aimed at Iranian logistical centers there. These follow on an increase in the frequency of such attacks in recent weeks, which have included strikes on the Aleppo airport on August 31 and September 6. Jonathan Spyer comments:

The specific targeting of the Aleppo airport is almost certainly related to recent indications that Iran is relying increasingly on its “air bridge” to Syria and Lebanon, because of Israel’s successful and systematic targeting of efforts to move weaponry and equipment by land [via Iraq]. But the increased tempo of activity is not solely related to the specific issue of greater use of air transport by Teheran. Rather, it is part of a broader picture of increasing regional tension. There are a number of factors that contribute to this emergent picture.

Firstly, Russia appears to be pulling back in Syria. . . . There are no prospects for a complete Russian withdrawal. The air base at Khmeimim and the naval facilities at Tartus and Latakia are hard strategic assets which will be maintained. The maintenance of Assad’s rule is also a clear objective for Moscow. But beyond this, the Russians are busy now with a flailing, faltering military campaign in Ukraine. Moscow lacks the capacity for two close strategic engagements at once.

Secondly, assuming that some last-minute twist does not occur, it now looks like a return to the [2015 nuclear deal] is not imminent. In the absence of any diplomatic process related to the Iranian nuclear program, and given Israeli determination to roll back Iran’s regional ambitions, confrontation becomes more likely.

Lastly, it is important to note that the uptick in Israeli activity is clearly not related to Syria alone. Rather, it is part of a more general broadening and deepening by Israel in recent months of its assertive posture toward the full gamut of Iranian activity in the region. . . . The increasing scope and boldness of Israeli air activity in Syria reflects this changing of the season.