North Korea, China, Pakistan, and Iran together constitute a contiguous expanse of territory stretching across Asia. Each of the four possesses chemical and biological weapons. While the Islamic Republic is currently working to develop nuclear capabilities as well, the other three already have them. Moreover, Pyongyang and Tehran have for years cooperated in the development of nuclear technology and long-range missiles. Beijing, the most powerful of the four, maintains good relations with the others. Considering the implications for Israel of this loose but dangerous alliance, Dany Shoham writes:

On September 8, a meeting took place between the chairman of the Iranian parliament’s national-security and foreign-policy commission and the North Korean ambassador. . . . The meeting was held to discuss the launch of financial and barter networks between the two countries. The U.S. special representative for Iran and Venezuela, Elliott Abrams, responded by saying, “We are very concerned about Iran’s cooperation with North Korea. . . . We will be watching the cooperation with North Korea very carefully and doing what we can to prevent it.”

While the territory comprising North Korea, China, Pakistan, and Iran might form a cardinal unified factor within the geostrategic system of the eastern hemisphere (and beyond), the interactions of China and Iran with Israel are especially meaningful in the [Middle East]. Two remarkable examples . . . are the recent Iranian cyberattack on Israel’s drinking water, which aimed to destabilize the chlorine level and [thereby] poison the country’s citizens; and the approaching operational management of the port of Haifa’s New Bay Terminal—not far from Haifa Naval Base, which houses Israeli submarines, missile boats, and other vessels—by the Shanghai-based, government-owned SIPG, from 2021 to 2046.

If China finds that it needs to prioritize between Iran and Israel—an entirely conceivable scenario—it will favor Iran, no matter what the context.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.