North Korea, China, Pakistan, and Iran together constitute a contiguous expanse of territory stretching across Asia. Each of the four possesses chemical and biological weapons. While the Islamic Republic is currently working to develop nuclear capabilities as well, the other three already have them. Moreover, Pyongyang and Tehran have for years cooperated in the development of nuclear technology and long-range missiles. Beijing, the most powerful of the four, maintains good relations with the others. Considering the implications for Israel of this loose but dangerous alliance, Dany Shoham writes:

On September 8, a meeting took place between the chairman of the Iranian parliament’s national-security and foreign-policy commission and the North Korean ambassador. . . . The meeting was held to discuss the launch of financial and barter networks between the two countries. The U.S. special representative for Iran and Venezuela, Elliott Abrams, responded by saying, “We are very concerned about Iran’s cooperation with North Korea. . . . We will be watching the cooperation with North Korea very carefully and doing what we can to prevent it.”

While the territory comprising North Korea, China, Pakistan, and Iran might form a cardinal unified factor within the geostrategic system of the eastern hemisphere (and beyond), the interactions of China and Iran with Israel are especially meaningful in the [Middle East]. Two remarkable examples . . . are the recent Iranian cyberattack on Israel’s drinking water, which aimed to destabilize the chlorine level and [thereby] poison the country’s citizens; and the approaching operational management of the port of Haifa’s New Bay Terminal—not far from Haifa Naval Base, which houses Israeli submarines, missile boats, and other vessels—by the Shanghai-based, government-owned SIPG, from 2021 to 2046.

If China finds that it needs to prioritize between Iran and Israel—an entirely conceivable scenario—it will favor Iran, no matter what the context.

In a recent article, the New York Times Magazine asserts that Benjamin Netanyahu “prolonged the war in Gaza to stay in power.” Niranjan Shankar takes the argument apart piece by piece, showing that for all its careful research, it fails to back up its basic claims. For instance: the article implies that Netanyahu torpedoed a three-point cease-fire proposal supported by the Biden administration in the spring of last year:

First of all, it’s crucial to note that Biden’s supposed “three-point plan” announced in May 2024 was originally an Israeli proposal. Of course, there was some back-and-forth and disagreement over how the Biden administration presented this initially, as Biden failed to emphasize that according to the three-point framework, a permanent cease-fire was conditional on Hamas releasing all of the hostages and stepping down. Regardless, the piece fails to mention that it was Hamas in June 2024 that rejected this framework!

It wasn’t until July 2024 that Hamas made its major concession—dropping its demand that Israel commit up front to a full end to the war, as opposed to doing so at a later stage of cease-fire/negotiations. Even then, U.S. negotiators admitted that both sides were still far from agreeing on a deal.

Even when the Times raises more credible criticisms of Israel—like when it brings up the IDF’s strategy of conducting raids rather than holding territory in the first stage of the war—it offers them in what seems like bad faith:

[W]ould the New York Times prefer that Israel instead started with a massive ground campaign with a “clear-hold-build” strategy from the get-go? Of course, if Israel had done this, there would have been endless criticism, especially under the Biden administration. But when Israel instead tried the “raid-and-clear” strategy, it gets blamed for deliberately dragging the war on.