Since the summer of 2018, Bashar al-Assad’s regime has regained at least nominal control over the southern part of Syria, with the help of its Russian and Iranian allies—although pockets remain that are in fact held by opposition groups. Carmit Valensi and Udi Dekel examine what the current situation means for the Jewish state and its efforts to prevent the area from becoming a base for Iranian attacks against it:

[T]he United States policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, continual Israeli attacks, and competition between Iran and Russia have slowed the pace of Iran’s consolidation [of its control] and forced Tehran to change the nature of its deployment in southern Syria, despite its determination to strengthen its grip. In the past, Shiite militias from outside Syria operated in the area. Today, however, Iran relies on local groups—homeland-defense forces and local militias that it recruits, equips, and trains; Syrian army units under Iranian influence; and especially Hizballah.

Russia, although it shares Iran’s goal of keeping Assad in power, has its own interests in the region different from those of the Islamic Republic:

Despite Iran’s determination to strengthen its grip on the area, it has recently been forced to downsize its activity there, due to budgetary constraints and Russia’s restraining measures. Russia itself, however, has only limited ability to curtail Iranian consolidation efforts in southern Syria, let alone expel Iran and its proxies from the area. The Assad regime has in effect adopted a “passive neutrality” in the competition between Russia and Iran.

In order to prevent Iran from using its proxies to create a border of friction in the Golan Heights marked by terrorism and high tension, Israel should take advantage of the weakness of the Iranian-Shiite axis, including the Assad regime. It can use its mechanism for coordination and deconfliction with Russia to adopt a proactive policy in southern Syria and attack the Iranian proxies there, including Hizballah forces. At the same time, Israel should strengthen local forces, both Sunni and Druze, and forge connections by means of humanitarian aid—food, fuel, and health services—with elements in the local population that oppose the regime. This will create an “island of Israeli influence,” thereby disrupting Iran’s drive to consolidate its proxies’ presence in southern Syria.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.