Since the summer of 2018, Bashar al-Assad’s regime has regained at least nominal control over the southern part of Syria, with the help of its Russian and Iranian allies—although pockets remain that are in fact held by opposition groups. Carmit Valensi and Udi Dekel examine what the current situation means for the Jewish state and its efforts to prevent the area from becoming a base for Iranian attacks against it:
[T]he United States policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, continual Israeli attacks, and competition between Iran and Russia have slowed the pace of Iran’s consolidation [of its control] and forced Tehran to change the nature of its deployment in southern Syria, despite its determination to strengthen its grip. In the past, Shiite militias from outside Syria operated in the area. Today, however, Iran relies on local groups—homeland-defense forces and local militias that it recruits, equips, and trains; Syrian army units under Iranian influence; and especially Hizballah.
Russia, although it shares Iran’s goal of keeping Assad in power, has its own interests in the region different from those of the Islamic Republic:
Despite Iran’s determination to strengthen its grip on the area, it has recently been forced to downsize its activity there, due to budgetary constraints and Russia’s restraining measures. Russia itself, however, has only limited ability to curtail Iranian consolidation efforts in southern Syria, let alone expel Iran and its proxies from the area. The Assad regime has in effect adopted a “passive neutrality” in the competition between Russia and Iran.
In order to prevent Iran from using its proxies to create a border of friction in the Golan Heights marked by terrorism and high tension, Israel should take advantage of the weakness of the Iranian-Shiite axis, including the Assad regime. It can use its mechanism for coordination and deconfliction with Russia to adopt a proactive policy in southern Syria and attack the Iranian proxies there, including Hizballah forces. At the same time, Israel should strengthen local forces, both Sunni and Druze, and forge connections by means of humanitarian aid—food, fuel, and health services—with elements in the local population that oppose the regime. This will create an “island of Israeli influence,” thereby disrupting Iran’s drive to consolidate its proxies’ presence in southern Syria.
Read more on Institute for National Security Studies: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/south-syria-threat/