Last month, the Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas turned eighty-five, and in January he will complete the sixteenth year of the four-year term to which he was elected. At this point, he shows no sign of retiring or naming a successor. Michael Milstein sums up his reign:

Abbas . . . became both an asset and a burden for Israel, as well as the Palestinians. He enabled strategic stability in the West Bank despite the profound shockwaves of the past decade; contributed to the Arab Spring bypassing the Palestinians; blocked Hamas advances; and maintained close ties with Israel. At the same time, he adhered to a dogmatic political line, losing political opportunities—most notably the proposals raised in the [2007] Annapolis talks—which led to the ossification of the Palestinian leadership, while he headed a regime plagued by corruption and human-rights abuses.

His tenure will likely go down in history as the best and worst the Palestinian system has known, especially in the West Bank: stability and prosperity hand in hand with a deep and lasting crisis.

When the day after Abbas finally comes, argues Milstein, Israel must do what it can to try to ensure the continuation of this stability, and to prevent a takeover by Hamas or Islamic State—while at the same time resisting the dangerous temptation to play the kingmaker. If Jerusalem can do so, the future need not be grim:

Joe Biden’s tenure may . . . help stabilize the Palestinian system. . . . The upheaval in Washington has already inspired calm and cautious optimism in Ramallah. . . . The future will of course also depend on the decisions that the Palestinians must take. Will the [new] leaders of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah prefer to unite, rather than launch a violent struggle for power? . . . Will they understand that that an agenda of confrontation with Israel likely means a short tenure, and their survival requires a close connection to Israel?

And perhaps a young generation will rise to power—a generation free of the rhetoric of the past that will prioritize the goal of a state “here and now,” even if modest in size and status, over the continued adherence to a fading and receding vision.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.