Because the Knesset failed to pass a budget by midnight on Tuesday, Israel will be holding elections—for the fourth time in two years—in March of 2021. The failure to pass a budget, however, is only the proximate cause. Among the numerous factors leading to the collapse are the fracturing of Benny Gantz’s Blue and White party, which he brought into the current unity government with Benjamin Netanyahu; Netanyahu’s maneuvers to prevent Gantz from succeeding him as prime minister, per the terms of the coalition deal; and the decision of Gideon Sa’ar—formerly the Likud party’s number two—to break with Netanyahu to form his own party. Haviv Rettig Gur explains what the next election might bring:

If one thinks of the four elections held between April 2019 and March 2021 not as four distinct political events but as a single, long-running contest, Netanyahu’s situation appears to have worsened this week. Over the last three races, he led a Likud list that won between 32 and 36 seats at the ballot box. Likud now polls around 28.

Far more importantly, the diverse but vehemently anti-Netanyahu coalition once led by Gantz had struggled to clear the 61-seat threshold for a parliamentary majority. Over the past two weeks, by contrast, those parties that declare themselves opposed to Netanyahu’s continued rule are polling at close to 80 seats. All the major [polls] found that there may be a slim anti-Netanyahu majority on the center-right, which won’t require left-wing and Arab-majority parties to survive. That’s a dangerous sea-change for Netanyahu.

[Moreover], Netanyahu’s reputation for dishonesty has severely limited his ability to strike the deals that may save him. To stay in power after March, he must win outright. It is no longer enough to fight his opponents to a draw, as he did over the last three races.

The right, [meanwhile], has grown in the polls compared to last year. Parties that self-identify as right-wing (including the ḥaredi factions) now account for roughly 80 Knesset seats. Yet the anti-Netanyahu camp has grown too. The divide over Netanyahu no longer tracks the left-right divide.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.