Earlier this month, the senior Knesset member Gideon Sa’ar left the ruling Likud party to establish a new one, called New Hope. Last week, Ze’ev Elkin—an immigrant from the USSR with unimpeachable right-wing credentials and a reputation as a gifted political tactician—announced that he is joining Sa’ar in the upcoming March elections. Elkin, until now a loyal supporter of Prime Minister Netanyahu, has thus sacrificed a guarantee of a cabinet position in a Likud government for the uncertain prospects of a new political venture. Haviv Rettig Gur observes:

Elkin earned his reputation [as a savvy political operator] the hard way, in legislative sausage-making in Israel’s cutthroat parliament. He is famously the only coalition chairman never to have lost a plenum vote. Or, rather, he lost one vote—the one that took place after he’d rushed out of the parliament building to join his wife in the hospital for the birth of their son.

There’s no magic or mystery to Elkin’s success as coalition chair. He believes in negotiations, loves the cut and thrust of parliamentary wrangling, and has never been afraid to be seen in the Knesset cafeteria hammering out agreements with lawmakers from far-left to far-right, secularist to ḥaredi, Jew and Arab alike. He exchanged jokes happily with the likes of Ahmad Tibi, a far reach across multiple political aisles for both men.

[But] Elkin’s decision reflects more than a single man’s political calculations. The ground is shifting within Likud. The mood has changed. Whether the growing disquiet eventually topples Netanyahu or is soon extinguished in the mobilizing fury of the coming race is anyone’s guess. But it’s there, it’s real, and it’s strong enough to drive some hard choices even among loyal party members.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.