Hamas’s Show of Force in Gaza

On December 28, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and twelve other terrorist groups held massive joint military exercises in the Gaza Strip. Kobi Michael and Yohanan Tzoreff report:

In the large-scale exercise, rockets were launched toward the sea, attacks occurred on simulated IDF positions and included abductions of soldiers; drones and other technologies were displayed. The exercise took place against the backdrop of a severe crisis in Gaza caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the failure of the reconciliation efforts with the Palestinian Authority, Arab countries apparent sidelining of the Palestinian issue, and concerns of another military conflict with Israel.

This display of arms was meant, according to Michael and Tzoreff, to send a message of deterrence to Israel as well as to send a message “to the Palestinian public regarding the importance of unity and the continuation of the resistance to Israel as the forefront of the national struggle.” They add:

Hamas’s military show of force can be seen as an attempt to compensate for weakness vis-à-vis the local population in Gaza and rogue factions. The serious humanitarian plight in the Gaza Strip could fan the flames of popular protest, which, if it spirals out of control, could create suitable conditions for Israel and the Palestinian Authority . . . to retake control of the Gaza Strip and dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure. The loss of Hamas’s main asset, control of Gaza, could set it back years. It could also critically damage Hamas’s standing as the leader of the “resistance.”

From Israel’s perspective, the exercise held in the Gaza Strip does not have far-reaching military or security implications. Nor does it indicate intentions of escalation on the part of Hamas: organizers are aware of the attention that any demonstration of force attracts in Israel and see the widespread media coverage and accompanying commentary as an achievement.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Gaza Strip, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Israeli Security

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF