On December 30, Jonathan Pollard arrived in Israel. Pollard was arrested in 1985, for knowingly passing classified information to Israeli agents while working for U.S. naval intelligence. Although he was sentenced to life in prison, Pollard was released on parole in 2015, on condition that he remain in the U.S. That condition, and other terms of parole, were lifted in November 2020, bringing to the end a painful episode for American Jewry. Abraham Ben-Zvi writes

There is no doubt that the U.S. government treated Pollard with exceptional severity and harshness. . . . One cannot, [however], minimize the severity of Pollard’s actions, which led to the breach of trust in the close relationship between Israel and the United States. However, the Americans clearly wanted to make an example of Pollard, an example no one will ever forget, and therefore treated him with disproportionate revenge. Other American spies, like Steven Lalas, for instance, also revealed sensitive information to U.S. allies but received much lighter sentences.

When Pollard was exposed as a spy, American Jews were plunged into . . . crisis, as anyone who had the slightest connection to Israel was suddenly treated with suspicion and was suspected of disloyalty. Even though Pollard’s actions might have been motivated by a genuine concern for Israel’s security, he nevertheless accepted money for revealing classified information. Israel must ensure that even the tiniest traces of the Pollard affair will not repeat themselves.

This is especially important at this time, as Pollard’s aliyah coincides with the arrival of a new Democratic president at the White House, who spoke out harshly against Pollard in the past. Any ostentatious move on Israel’s part with regards to this sensitive subject—including making Pollard a political player in the election campaign—could rekindle the long-term source of friction between the two allies.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.