For decades, the U.S. military has divided the world into various regions, with one of them—Central Command (CENTCOM)—including everything from Egypt to Pakistan. A glaring anomaly in this system has been Israel, which until two weeks ago remained under the umbrella of the European Command. Shaul Chorev, Douglas J. Feith, Gary Roughead, Seth Cropsey, and Jack Dorsett praise the U.S. decision to include the Jewish state in CENTCOM’s ambit:

Arab officials from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain. and elsewhere now openly talk of Israel as a strategic partner in opposing Iranian aggression, Islamic State, and other Islamist extremist groups. Whether or not it ever made sense, the idea that Israel must remain out of Central Command was now clearly outdated.

Central Command planners should take full advantage of America’s military and intelligence relationships with Israel. It was neither necessary, advantageous, nor historically justified to exclude Israel from efforts by the Central Command to bolster its military plans through regional cooperation.

Israel’s inclusion in the Central Command’s area of responsibility adds to the ability of both states to respond effectively in a crisis. Moreover, this change now . . . enables direct coordination on the sea lanes and at strategic choke points of the Red Sea that are vital to Israeli security and prosperity.

Moving Israel into Central Command’s area of responsibility will facilitate military cooperation with Israel. And it might promote more contact and cooperation between Israel and the Arab states.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.