For decades, nearly every U.S. president has made some effort to end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and there is no reason to think that the incoming administration will be an exception. Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman argue that, rather than simply oppose any such attempt on the grounds that it is unlikely to succeed, Jerusalem should present a plan of its own, which American policy-makers can take into account as they develop their own proposals:

President-elect Joe Biden has welcomed the growing acceptance of Israel in the region, and signaled that some aspects of his predecessor’s Mideast policy (such as the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and recognition of Israel’s sovereignty on the Golan Heights) will not be rescinded. Nor can Biden easily undue the restrictions on U.S. aid to the Palestinians that flow from the Taylor Force Act.

Regarding the substance of future negotiations, . . . it is unlikely that a Biden administration would back maximalist (and non-implementable) Palestinian demands, such as establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem (and the Temple Mount) as its capital, and a softened “right of return” for Palestinian refugees their descendants to Israel.

[An Israeli peace initiative] can preserve the basic strategic gains contained in outgoing administration’s approach. Speaking the language that Democrats in the U.S. prefer to hear, the point can be made that the real options for progress towards peace lie with abandonment of the fantasy of coercion [of the parties into an agreement], and with resuming negotiations towards a compromise between the two national movements. In parallel, the point can be made that even if little happens “top-down,” adopting “bottom-up” economic packages conducive to Palestinian welfare would be useful.

This initiative should reiterate the territorial principles put forward by Prime Minister Yitzḥak Rabin (who is a hero of peace for many Americans, especially Democrats) in his last speech to the Knesset in October 1995. Thus an Israeli peace plan should give prominence to security arrangements; to the strategic importance of the Jordan Valley; to the unity of Jerusalem as a living city; to rejection of the so-called Palestinian “right of return” and to recognition that there are two refugee problems, not one; and to an end to PA incitement, boycott efforts, and support for terror and terrorists.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.