Why a Military Conflict between Iran and Israel Seems Inevitable

Since the year began, the IDF has stepped up its attacks on Iranian positions in Syria, striking more targets and going deeper into Syrian territory than usual. Meanwhile, Tehran has increased its enrichment of uranium, moving ever closer to building nuclear weapons. Efraim Inbar addresses the situation in depth:

The stakes of the ruling elite in Iran in preserving [the] nuclear program are inextricably connected to its political and even physical survival. Therefore, the mullahs are interested in presenting to the world a nuclear fait accompli. Achievement of this goal is facilitated by Western reluctance to use force. . . . The belief that stringent economic sanctions could make Tehran reconsider its nuclear ambitions or bring about regime change is widespread. However, imposing sanctions on Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein for years yielded no results. Similarly, sanctions on North Korea and Russia have not produced change in the behavior of these states.

Iran produces a variety of long-range missiles. . . . It also has developed a cruise missile with a range beyond 2,000 kilometers. [Thus] Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states are within range, as are several important U.S. bases. Further improvements in Iranian missiles could put most European capitals, and eventually the North American continent, within reach of a potential attack.

Despite relentless Israeli attacks, Iran has shown determination to continue with its projects, even though it faces domestic problems as a result of U.S. sanctions, dwindling oil revenues, street protests, a harsh economic reality, and recently a COVID-19 crisis.

Under additional pressure, Iran may revert to a strategy of “talk and build” to buy time. Such a strategy capitalizes on European and American reluctance to escalate. . . . Essentially, inconclusive talks preserve a status quo, a tense standoff in which Iran can go on uninhibited with its nuclear program.

Assuming that Israel has the capability to destroy the key elements of the Iranian program, [doing so] makes eminent strategic sense. Unfortunately, only military action can prevent the descent of the Middle East into an even more brutish and dangerous region.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Iran, Iran nuclear program, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF