In January, Israel’s National Insurance Institute (NII) released its yearly report on the economic situation of the citizenry, which paints a shocking picture, suggesting that one fourth of Israeli children live in poverty. Another government report puts the number at one in three. But, Amiad Cohen argues, these indices represent “a statistical fiction, radically different from the reality.” Worse still, the most recent NII statistics were deliberately reworked when the initial set appeared to downplay the effects of the pandemic:

In other words, the poverty indices misrepresent the number of people in serious financial need, often increasing [it] dramatically. These reports measure only a certain type of income and its distribution across society. They do not measure material deprivation and therefore do not provide any measure that would allow for the formulation of a policy to eradicate poverty.

The poverty index also completely ignores property ownership. Imagine that with hard work and good luck you [took the company you own public] and have a huge fortune of $10 million in your bank account. Thanks to this great fortune you have allowed yourself to go on a one-year vacation. During this year, you do not have a regular income. Well, according to the poverty index . . . you are considered “poor.”

Because the official poverty indices are flawed, government welfare policy based on these statistics does not and cannot provide a proper solution to real poverty. In the name of a “War on Poverty,” the government of Israel invests huge sums, much of which are wasted. [These expenditures make] only marginal contributions to those who are truly poor and suffering from severe material deprivation.

[These] problematic measurement methods are an excellent tool for preserving the power of the NII and for preserving the power of politicians. The way in which poverty rates are measured in Israel allows authorities to “play” with the data and move (through welfare distributions) families from below the poverty line above it, without contributing to their social mobility and without improving their real earning capacity. Unlike other in-kind income, the benefits are included in the calculated income and thus “results” can be easily achieved.

If there is to be peace, Palestinians will have to unlearn the hatred of Israel they have imbibed during nearly two decades of Hamas rule. This will be a difficult task, but Cole Aronson argues, drawing on the experiences of World War II, that Israel has already gotten off to a strong start:

The population’s compliance can . . . be won by a new regime that satisfies its immediate material needs, even if that new regime is sponsored by a government until recently at war with the population’s former regime. Axis civilians were made needy through bombing. Peaceful compliance with the Allies became a good alternative to supporting violent resistance to the Allies.

Israel’s current campaign makes a moderate Gaza more likely, not less. Destroying Hamas not only deprives Islamists of the ability to rule—it proves the futility of armed resistance to Israel, a condition for peace. The destruction of buildings not only deprives Hamas of its hideouts. It also gives ordinary Palestinians strong reasons to shun groups planning to replicate Hamas’s behavior.