Over the weekend, an Israeli woman—reportedly with a history of mental illness—who had snuck into Syria two weeks ago was returned to Israel via Moscow. In exchange, Jerusalem, in negotiations with the Kremlin, agreed to release two captured Syrian shepherds who were likely engaged in military reconnaissance. According to the New York Times and several other media outlets, Prime Minister Netanyahu has also arranged to purchase Russian-made coronavirus vaccines on behalf of the Syrian government as part of the deal. Yoav Limor comments:

In past deals, Israel sought to avoid concessions not directly related to the deal itself. The argument was that doing so would open a dangerous door to a bevy of strange demands from the other side in the future, from money to weapons to other diplomatic concessions. . . . The Israeli government made a legitimate decision to deviate from its customary position, but [its attempt to keep this part of the agreement secret] raises questions and concerns.

On the surface, Russia had no reason to insist on Israel paying for the vaccines. It is a minuscule sum that doesn’t affect its economy. Just to put things in perspective: every month, Russia transfers to Syria anti-aircraft batteries to replace those destroyed or damaged in Israeli airstrikes, at a cost of tens of millions of dollars. Although Syria is supposed to pay for these batteries, in actuality it can’t afford them and receives them for free.

Hence, it appears Russia’s main goal was to show Israel who the real boss in the area is; to humiliate it a little, and along the way make a quick buck. This is regrettable for many reasons, mainly because Israel could have leveraged (with Syria and the Palestinians) the vaccines it possesses toward significant achievements for itself rather than for others. Not doing so, together with accepting the Russian dictate—could send a [unsalutary] message to the region that Israel only understands force.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.