Yesterday, the IDF tested an upgraded version of its fabled Iron Dome anti-missile system, including units that will soon be installed on its new Sa’ar 6 warships, the first of which arrived in Haifa in December. The new vessels, combined with the adoption of the Iron Dome to be used against maritime threats, represents a major step forward for Israel’s naval strategy. Yaakov Lappin explains why such a change is necessary:

Israel’s dependence on the sea has never been greater, and is set to expand even further in coming years. The Tamar offshore [natural-gas] rigs are located west of Gaza in Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while the Leviathan [rig] is off the Haifa coastline. The Karish and Tanin gas fields are located north of Leviathan in the Mediterranean Sea. The rigs deliver liquefied natural gas to the coast, where they are converted to electricity in power stations. Some 70 percent of Israel’s electric consumption is now based on natural gas.

Around half of Israel’s fresh water comes from the Mediterranean Sea via five desalination plants, with two more expected to come online in the next few years. The vast majority of Israel’s imports also arrive via the sea. [In short], the sea remains Israel’s longest border and its chief electricity source, water supply, and means of bringing goods into the country.

In 2013, Jerusalem ordered the navy to revamp its strategic concepts in order to keep up with its growing importance; the newly added technology is part of that new strategy, but so is a new focus on sea-to-land combat. Lappin writes:

[T]he 2006 Second Lebanon War made clear that it was time for the navy to update its doctrine. When [an Israeli] frigate was hit by a Hizballah shore-to-sea missile, the navy saw that things had changed. The arms race that flooded the region with precision-guided missiles and new types of rockets meant Israeli targets both on land and at sea faced a new level of exposure.

Hamas, for its part, is heavily investing in its naval commando assets—an investment that includes the construction of underwater tunnels used by Hamas scuba attackers.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.