Yesterday, the IDF tested an upgraded version of its fabled Iron Dome anti-missile system, including units that will soon be installed on its new Sa’ar 6 warships, the first of which arrived in Haifa in December. The new vessels, combined with the adoption of the Iron Dome to be used against maritime threats, represents a major step forward for Israel’s naval strategy. Yaakov Lappin explains why such a change is necessary:

Israel’s dependence on the sea has never been greater, and is set to expand even further in coming years. The Tamar offshore [natural-gas] rigs are located west of Gaza in Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while the Leviathan [rig] is off the Haifa coastline. The Karish and Tanin gas fields are located north of Leviathan in the Mediterranean Sea. The rigs deliver liquefied natural gas to the coast, where they are converted to electricity in power stations. Some 70 percent of Israel’s electric consumption is now based on natural gas.

Around half of Israel’s fresh water comes from the Mediterranean Sea via five desalination plants, with two more expected to come online in the next few years. The vast majority of Israel’s imports also arrive via the sea. [In short], the sea remains Israel’s longest border and its chief electricity source, water supply, and means of bringing goods into the country.

In 2013, Jerusalem ordered the navy to revamp its strategic concepts in order to keep up with its growing importance; the newly added technology is part of that new strategy, but so is a new focus on sea-to-land combat. Lappin writes:

[T]he 2006 Second Lebanon War made clear that it was time for the navy to update its doctrine. When [an Israeli] frigate was hit by a Hizballah shore-to-sea missile, the navy saw that things had changed. The arms race that flooded the region with precision-guided missiles and new types of rockets meant Israeli targets both on land and at sea faced a new level of exposure.

Hamas, for its part, is heavily investing in its naval commando assets—an investment that includes the construction of underwater tunnels used by Hamas scuba attackers.

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.