Yesterday, Naftali Bennett, leader of the right-wing Israeli party Yamina, signed a pledge that he will not enter into a governing coalition with the left-of-center party Yesh Atid. In doing so, he has capitulated to pressure from Benjamin Netanyahu, whose Likud party is expected to get a plurality of the votes in tomorrow’s election, but who will be hard-pressed to form a coalition without Bennett. Haviv Rettig Gur examines the dilemma which Bennett and Netanyahu—fierce rivals for right-wing votes—will likely find themselves in after tomorrow’s election.

Bennett cannot reasonably ask for a rotation as prime minister [in a Likud-led coalition], but there is a demand he might make: . . . a “parity” government, a cabinet where Bennett and Netanyahu have an equal number of ministers, and where Bennett has the sole power to fire ministers under his control. Bennett would thereby also gain a veto over the cabinet agenda.

[But Bennett’s] bid for office rests on the premise that Netanyahu’s government has failed the country and that Netanyahu’s governing style has exacted a terrible cost for all Israelis. Just as Bennett will be hard-pressed to deny the right-wing its coalition, so he’ll be under immense pressure to show that the coalition he will be helping to form won’t be merely one more Netanyahu government in which he serves as just one more bit player and political servant.

In short, from Bennett’s perspective, a demand for parity is sensible and necessary. It would ensure Netanyahu carries out his commitments and grant Bennett the kind of policy influence he believes he deserves. And if Bennett takes that path, Netanyahu will face a painful dilemma. His next cabinet is already a crowded place.

Netanyahu is already said to be considering an idea bandied about last year after Likud MKs expressed bitterness at the number of ministries handed to Blue and White in the unity agreement. He may seek to rotate two or three ministers through each post during the next government’s term. It’s a great way to give stately honors to a large number of unhappy MKs; it’s a terrible way to govern.

As this newsletter noted last week, Gaza is not suffering from famine, and the efforts to suggest that it is—which have been going on since at least the beginning of last year—are based on deliberate manipulation of the data. Nor, as Shany Mor explains, does international law require Israel to feed its enemies:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does oblige High Contracting Parties to allow for the free passage of medical and religious supplies along with “essential foodstuff, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen” for the civilians of another High Contracting Party, as long as there is no serious reason for fearing that “the consignments may be diverted from their destination,” or “that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy” by the provision.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is, of course, not a High Contracting Party, and, more importantly, Israel has reason to fear both that aid provisions are diverted by Hamas and that a direct advantage is accrued to it by such diversions. Not only does Hamas take provisions for its own forces, but its authorities sell provisions donated by foreign bodies and use the money to finance its war. It’s notable that the first reports of Hamas’s financial difficulties emerged only in the past few weeks, once provisions were blocked.

Yet, since the war began, even European states considered friendly to Israel have repeatedly demanded that Israel “allow unhindered passage of humanitarian aid” and refrain from seizing territory or imposing “demographic change”—which means, in practice, that Gazan civilians can’t seek refuge abroad. These principles don’t merely constitute a separate system of international law that applies only to Israel, but prolong the suffering of the people they are ostensibly meant to protect:

By insisting that Hamas can’t lose any territory in the war it launched, the international community has invented a norm that never before existed and removed one of the few levers Israel has to pressure it to end the war and release the hostages.

These commitments have . . . made the plight of the hostages much worse and much longer. They made the war much longer than necessary and much deadlier for both sides. And they locked a large civilian population in a war zone where the de-facto governing authority was not only indifferent to civilian losses on its own side, but actually had much to gain by it.