During the past year, Israel’s Homefront Command has been tasked with providing COVID-19 tests, ensuring that local communities and municipal officials understand Health Ministry regulations, and other endeavors connected with combatting the illness. These circumstances gave Colonel Nissim Tourgeman an opportunity to work with the Arab villages in his area of responsibility. Interviewed by Udi Shaham, he notes the positive effects of the resulting cooperation for both the military and the civilians:

What might seem natural in non-Arab [municipalities], things that we learn in the army and practice in management, were new to some Arab mayors and leaders. We brought what we know, and gave them tools that would help them overcome the obstacles that the virus brings with it.

[For our part], we didn’t know the power of traditions, such as condolence visits after a family death. In the village of Ein Mahel, we saw that the death rate was getting out of control, and became proportionally larger than all the communities around it. . . . It happened that someone died of the coronavirus, and many of his family members also had it without knowing—and without symptoms. Then half of the village came to pay their condolences and got it too.

We had a hard time convincing people to stop that custom. By cooperating with the mayor and religious figures, we managed to replace the physical gathering with phone calls. Then, the infection rate suddenly dropped.

[N]ow, we see more and more Arab youth that want to join the Home Front Command and volunteer. . . . It became natural to see Home Front Command soldiers in the Arab towns. . . . Once, when we were operating in Nazareth and people were standing in line, I heard someone asking his friend, “Who are these soldiers? What are they doing here?” and the friend replied, “It’s okay, it’s the Home Front Command. They are here to help us.”

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.