Last week, the Helios Ray, a ship owned by an Israeli company, was struck by a missile fired either by the Iranian military or one of its many proxy groups. Alex Fishman comments:

Whoever dispatched a missile at the cargo ship could have launched multiple missiles that would have caused far greater damage. But that would have been considered an act of war by the United States and all other nations responsible for safe travel in the Gulf waters.

The Helios Ray sails under the Bahaman flag, is not registered in Israel, and is not manned by an Israeli crew. Unlike Israeli vessels flying the Israeli flag, the cargo ship was not protected by the country’s security services. Iran’s efforts to hit vulnerable Israeli targets on the high seas are not new and have intensified since the assassination of the Islamic Republic’s chief nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh last November.

The vessel that was targeted last week belongs to a company owned by the Israeli businessman Rami Unger. This fact is displayed on maritime websites along with other details about the ship, which always uses the same route when it makes its way to the Far East. The boat left the southern Israeli port of Eilat in early February, carrying cargo for Saudi Arabia and Dubai, and was likely under surveillance since then. It was attacked as it entered the Gulf of Oman, an advantageous location for Iran’s navy, to convey a message to Jerusalem that Israeli interests in the area could be compromised.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.