In December of 2018, the Knesset voted to dissolve itself, triggering early elections. Since then, the Jewish state had two inconclusive elections, both resulting in do-overs, and a third that yielded a unity government, which lasted for all of seven months. The fourth election, held on Tuesday, has proved similarly indecisive, and the possibility of another unstable and short-lived governing coalition, or even a fifth election, looms large. David Horovitz takes stock of the situation:

The pro-Netanyahu camp has 52 of the 120 Knesset seats. The anti-Netanyahu camp has 57. Naftali Bennett’s [right-wing] Yamina, possibly inclined toward Netanyahu, has seven. And the great election confounder, the conservative Islamic Ra’am party—which not one of the three ostensibly ultra-accurate TV exit polls predicted would make it into the Knesset—has four.

Dismally, Israel has been hamstrung by political crisis since way back in December 2018. . . . But its politics have not been paralyzed. These latest inconclusive elections saw Gideon Sa’ar break away from Likud, and Bennett directly challenge Netanyahu—rivals from his own side of the spectrum who rendered Tuesday’s vote the closest yet to a pure referendum on the prime minister, with forces left, right, and center all vying to oust him.

He’s not finished yet, but neither was he victorious, despite the vaccination success, which enabled the electorate to cram the supermarkets, beaches, and restaurants on election day.

Four inconclusive votes in less than two years, with no state budget and a crippled parliament, would indicate that [Israel’s] electoral system is dysfunctional. For now, at least, the pillars of our democracy are holding firm.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.