How the Recent Sabotage of an Iranian Nuclear Facility Relates to Negotiations with the U.S.

According to recent reports, American nuclear negotiators in Vienna have expressed willingness to roll back significantly sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, a major power outage at the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz—thought to have been caused by Israeli sabotage—has set back Tehran’s progress in producing the fuel necessary for an atomic bomb. Eran Lerman examines the relationship between these developments:

The main goal of the Iranian regime at present is to generate a sense of urgency in the West—specifically, the Biden administration. Senior American officials, including Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, already have quoted alarmist assessments as to Iran’s breakout time to justify a quick return to the [nuclear deal of] 2015; and only then to negotiate a “longer, stronger, broader” agreement. But with U.S. leverage frittered away following the easing of sanctions, what will motivate the Iranian regime to compromise? Should the U.S. succumb to arguments of urgency, which are manipulated by Iran, the prospects of achieving the goals President Biden himself has set will be next to nil.

This highlights the supreme importance of the serious damage inflicted upon the enrichment facility at Natanz. . . . If the battle is for time, then every moment is of the essence. Therefore, the U.S. should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran’s ability to breakout towards a bomb, and certainly of a setback measured in months. The time gained should be used to sustain the pressure on Iran towards a better agreement—without the current “sunset clauses.”

Alas, European appeasement of Hitler is the historical analogy that comes to mind. [Britain’s Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain, who probably understood what sort of villain he was dealing with, wanted to gain time, and was tempted to believe that his concessions to Hitler in 1938 bought him a couple of crucial years. (They did not. War came within eleven months). . . . Once the wish to gain time drives a willingness to accept the demands of a ruthless, totalitarian regime hellbent on subversion and destruction—the tragic consequences are inevitable. It is this insight that should be imparted to friends in American politics and diplomacy.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Iran, Iran nuclear program, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF