On Tuesday, the U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan met in Washington with his Israeli counterpart, Meir Ben-Shabbat, and the two agreed to establish a working group to address Iran’s distribution of military drones and advanced missiles to its allies. The same day, notes Elliott Abrams, a report appeared that, according to Israeli officials, Russia is providing protection to Iranian maritime arms smuggling:

Russia appears willing to assist Iran now in placing precision-guided missiles in Syria, for Syrian use but also for transfer to Hizballah. This may mean fewer Israeli attacks on land convoys, but it will also mean more attacks on locations in Syria and eventually Lebanon where such weapons are stored. [This] threat is one that Israel has been intent on diminishing to the extent possible, because such missiles could do great damage if Israel and Hizballah ever come into conflict as they did in 2006.

Israel will not decide that its efforts must cease because the shipments are now going by sea rather than land, and it will have no alternative but to hit the shipments when they arrive in Syria or Lebanon. To date, Israel has avoided such strikes at Lebanon and hit only inside Syria—but that cannot last.

The establishment of a new U.S.-Israel working group is a sensible move, if it allows Israel to keep the United States informed on what weapons are arriving in Syria—and on Israel’s general policy and intentions regarding those weapons. But it solves nothing, and cannot be a substitute for action. Working groups offer Israel no protection from precision-guided Iranian missiles that arrive in Syria and Lebanon. Only Israeli action can do that, and we can expect that we will see more of it in the coming months and years.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.