Last night, Houthi rebels in Yemen launched an explosive drone and two ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia. The Houthis—backed by the Islamic Republic and responsible for their country’s bloody civil war—have as their slogan “Death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam,” but they have so far limited themselves to inflicting violence on their fellow Yemenis and the neighboring Saudis. However, write Ari Heistein and Elisha Stoin, there are some easily conceivable scenarios where the Houthis could decide to use their arsenal of drones and missiles against the Jewish state. At present, some of these weapons could reach Israel’s borders, although not very effectively. Yet that too could change:

[T]he central concern in this context is the possibility of a technological leap in the event that the Houthis are provided more advanced ballistic-missile capabilities by Iran—particularly advanced Shihab missiles that have considerably longer ranges and would be capable of reaching Israel from Yemen. This technology is readily available for Iranian forces, particularly through the Shihab-3 missile in its medium-range version.

[Moreover], it is also possible that in the future the Houthis will permit Iran’s . . . forces to launch advanced Iranian cruise missiles, drones, or ballistic missiles from Yemeni territory. This could occur in a scenario in which Tehran seeks to strike Israel while distancing itself from the attack and minimizing potential blowback.

Also, in 2020-2021, in what is likely an effort to demonstrate their commitment to the Palestinian cause, the Houthis have sought to gain the release of Hamas prisoners from Saudi jails in exchange for the release of Saudi airmen captured by the Houthis over the course of the Saudi campaign in Yemen. Once again, the Houthis appear to be using their limited resources in a manner that prioritizes a regional rather than a local agenda.

Even without direct hostilities between Israel and the Houthis, developments in the Yemeni civil war could affect Israel negatively. The theater serves as a testing ground of sorts for Iranian weapon systems, in particular their use against Western platforms. The rapid pace of improvement in Houthi capabilities, from amateurishly using rocket-propelled grenades in 2010 to using precision-guided missiles for well-coordinated assassination attempts in 2020, indicates a learning process that could create knowledge that is then (directly or indirectly) disseminated among other [members of Iran’s network of proxies], including Hizballah and Hamas.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.