Yesterday, a mere 35 minutes before the deadline, Yair Lapid—the leader of Israel’s Yesh Atid party—announced that he had succeeded in forming a governing coalition, cobbled together from parties across the political spectrum. Most notably, the eight-party coalition includes Ra’am, which will be the first Arab party ever to join an Israeli government. Yet nothing is certain, as a single defector could collapse the entire arrangement, and it could take up to twelve days before the Knesset formally approves it.

The Western press is already celebrating the new coalition as a major loss for the Israeli right, since it spells the end of Benjamin Netanyahu’s long tenure as prime minister. But in fact, the new government will include three decidedly right-wing parties. Lahav Harkov explains how this situation came to be:

The past decade is littered with political obituaries announcing Benjamin Netanyahu’s imminent departure from office—and each has ended up looking more absurd than the last. Here in Israel, predictions of his downfall have become a fixture of daily political life.

But even a political genius can make mistakes, and it looks like Netanyahu is about to get his comeuppance on one of his most enduring flaws: his cultivation of protégés whom he then discards, fearing that they might one day challenge him. For years, it seemed like this was just politics; Netanyahu didn’t want to promote someone only for that person to take him down, so he pre-emptively saw off any potential competitors.

Little did he know that there could one day be consequences. Israeli politicians are currently involved in coalition negotiations after another inconclusive parliamentary election. There are, of course, a number of reasons for Netanyahu’s inability to form a government in three of the past four elections. But the most important has been the right’s majority in the Knesset after each one, and [his former allies’] refusal to be part of a coalition led by Netanyahu.

And the leaders of the three main right-wing parties who have declined to be in Netanyahu’s coalition all have one thing in common: they all used to work closely with him—until they were no longer useful.

These three leaders include Naftali Bennett, who, if the new coalition is approved, will serve as prime minister for two years, followed by Lapid.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.