Israel’s Ungainly New Government, Despite Its Flaws, Might Be Just What the Country Needs

Yesterday, the leaders of the eight parties that form the Jewish state’s new governing-coalition-to-be met for the first time. Although the coalition was officially approved by the president, it is far from a sure thing that it will be voted in by the Knesset—which might not happen until next week. David M. Weinberg considers the merits of this highly unstable and ideologically heterogenous new government:

The coalition agreement . . . reminds me of a business contract where partners divvy-up assets in a situation of zero trust. The documents [specifying its terms] do not read as accords designed to heal the country. . . . In fact, all parties are expected to stymie other parts of the coalition on any issue of controversy, like issues of religion and state, alternative-family rights, diplomatic moves in the Palestinian arena, and even the much-needed, ramped-up policing of the Israeli Arab and Bedouin sectors.

In other words, the coalition deal is a cockamamie contrivance almost purposefully designed to achieve political paralysis. All parties are neutered, except where they might, hopefully, agree on overarching policies, such as health and economic recovery plans, and countering Iran.

Under normal circumstances, I would say that this is a terrible thing; an incoherent and impossible method to govern the country. It could fail in 1,000 different ways.

But these are not normal times. Israel cannot afford a fifth election within three years. Israel’s most critical challenges (like the likelihood of more military conflict with Iran and/or its proxies, and of Arab insurrection in Jerusalem) can best be tackled by a broad right-left government. . . . Even more important is the absolute and urgent need to tone down this country’s political heat; to restrain Israel’s raging political fevers after 32 months of furious campaigning.

Read more at David M. Weinberg

More about: Israeli Election 2021, Israeli politics

Egypt Is Trapped by the Gaza Dilemma It Helped to Create

Feb. 14 2025

Recent satellite imagery has shown a buildup of Egyptian tanks near the Israeli border, in violation of Egypt-Israel agreements going back to the 1970s. It’s possible Cairo wants to prevent Palestinians from entering the Sinai from Gaza, or perhaps it wants to send a message to the U.S. that it will take all measures necessary to keep that from happening. But there is also a chance, however small, that it could be preparing for something more dangerous. David Wurmser examines President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s predicament:

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and materiel to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability.

Now that the Trump administration is threatening to remove the population of Gaza, President Sisi is reaping the consequences of a problem he and his predecessors helped to sow. That, writes Wurmser, leaves him with a dilemma:

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts Trump’s plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or nakba. It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first nakba in 1948. Any leader who fails to stop a second nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. President Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

In a worst-case scenario, Wurmser argues, Sisi might decide that he’d rather fight a disastrous war with Israel and blow up his relationship with Washington than display that kind of weakness.

Read more at The Editors

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023