On Wednesday, the Knesset elected Israel’s next present, Isaac Herzog, who will assume office on July 9. Later the same day, Yair Lapid presented a coalition agreement to the current president, Reuven Rivlin. If the proposed coalition survives until its formal ratification by the Knesset, Naftali Bennett—who has spent the last several years trying to outflank the incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu from the right—will become the next prime minister. The agreement stipulates that Lapid, who leads the center-left party Yesh Atid, will replace Bennett after two years.

Daniel Gordis explains that the new government, although “rickety,” actually demonstrates the solidity of the Israeli center, and not only because it pulls together eight parties from across the political spectrum. He goes on to make some other observations:

Bennett will be Israel’s first religious, kippah-wearing prime minister. That reflects many important shifts in Israeli life. . . . Lapid, to my knowledge, will be the first prime minister who belongs to a Reform synagogue.

One New York Times headline declared that many Palestinians were viewing Israel’s developing political story with “little more than a shrug.” That’s not terribly surprising, since when it comes to the Palestinians, Israelis are fairly united, left and right. There’s no deal with the Palestinians looming anywhere on the horizon, regardless of which parties form the coalition.

[As if to explain why], another New York Times article noted that “The presence of Mr. Bennett at the threshold of power is testament to how Mr. Netanyahu has helped shift the pendulum of Israeli politics firmly to the right.” This, though, ignores the fact that the Palestinians have repeatedly rejected overtures from Israeli leaders. . . . Israeli politics moved to the right not because of Netanyahu, . . . but because even centrist and left-of-center Israelis have despaired of the Palestinians making a deal.

The two-state solution is alive and well—in the imaginations of Americans. Closer to home, it’s tragically seen as an idea out of a Disney movie: a sweet and enchanting idea for an ending to the story, utterly unrelated to the world we actually inhabit.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.