While Amnon Lord finds himself in agreement with the substance of Alternate Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s condemnation of a recent law passed by the Polish parliament ending any Jewish efforts to seek restitution for property stolen during and after the Holocaust, he argues against antagonizing Warsaw. It is better, Lord writes, “to be smart, not just right.”

The important thing . . . is that the Poland of today, despite its nationalism, is a type of ally—or it was until elements in Israel decided gradually to destroy relations with it. Cooperation with [Warsaw] in terms of military aviation is a cornerstone of [Israeli] national security. The Poles also buy weapons and other systems from us. Poland is an important potential partner for Israel, together with the member countries of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) in its effort to crack the West European bloc that holds anti-Israel views. Despite the desecration of Jewish gravestones in Poland, we can dare say that the Jews living there today are safer than the Jews living in France and some parts of the United States.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.