While the boycotts of Israeli institutions of higher learning by scholarly organizations, university departments, and individual faculty members are ostensibly intended to “end the occupation” or avoid “complicity in apartheid,” they have so far proved to have only a minimal impact on Israeli academia, and the chances that they will in any way contribute to changes in the Jewish state’s policies are negligible. What then, asks Martin Kramer, do their proponents seek to accomplish?

The academic boycott of Israel is actually meant to isolate and stigmatize Jewish academics in America. It serves the aim of pushing Jewish academics out of shrinking disciplines, where Jews are believed to be “overrepresented.” That is how diehard supporters of [boycotts] find academic allies who have little interest in Palestine, in fields like American studies or English literature. For these allies, it is not about the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. It is about the presumed Jewish occupation of American academe by Jewish faculty and administrators.

Kramer illustrates the point with the hypothetical example of a Jewish doctoral student who receives an invitation to participate in a conference at an Israeli university:

If she does go to Israel, someone might point a finger at her: she’s a boycott buster; she’s acted outside the bounds of her discipline; she’s been unprofessional. If she is up for appointment or tenure, does she want that conference in Israel on her CV? What if someone on the academic committee sees himself as a boycott enforcer, and spots it? Will this torpedo her candidacy or promotion?

She can turn down the invitation, say nothing, and become a Jew of silence. . . . But perhaps even silence isn’t enough if you are in the humanities. . . . So a third option is to show some virulent hostility yourself—especially if you are a Jew, and therefore naturally suspected of secretly being a Zionist.

Today . . . Jews are regarded not as targets of prejudice but as bearers of privilege. And in much of academe, especially the humanities and social sciences, student demand is weak and falling, full-time academic jobs are rare, and budgets are being cut. For every tenured position, the competition has become cutthroat. And where competition is cutthroat, anything goes. Academe now seethes with struggles over diversity, ethnicity, gender, and race, and it would be naïve to think that Jewish “overrepresentation” isn’t an issue anymore.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.