Yesterday, Bar-El Hadaria Shmueli—a sniper with the Israeli border police—died from a gunshot wound he received nine days earlier, when a Palestinian shot a pistol through a hole in the Gaza border fence. The attack was part of a series of violent disturbances that have taken place along the border—reminiscent of the 2018 “March of Return”—during which rioters hurled stones and explosives, and attempted to climb the fence. Alan Baker comments:

One of the central security elements of the 1995 Israel-Palestinian interim agreement (commonly termed “Oslo II”) was the creation of what was called the “Delimiting Line” along the entire northern and western edges of the Gaza Strip, separating the Strip from Israel’s sovereign territory. Part of this central security element was the establishment of a “security perimeter” adjacent to that line, within the Gaza Strip, hundreds of meters wide.

Following Israel’s 2005 unilateral disengagement from the Gaza, . . . Hamas has utilized and abused—and continues to utilize and abuse—this very same security perimeter for precisely the opposite purpose of that for which it was established. They have turned it into a zone for organized disorder and violence, a zone in which they sponsor, encourage, and organize periodic, mass, violent demonstrations, [and which they employ] as a staging area for attempted infiltrations and as a means, periodically, to put pressure on Israel, to attract international attention, and to extort Egypt, the UN, Qatar, and others to provide money and other forms of material and financial support.

Clearly, such a glaring vacuum in the security situation along the edge of the Gaza Strip, if allowed to continue, and if not filled by Israel with appropriate, alternative, and effective military and intelligence mechanisms, . . . is nothing more than an open invitation . . . for further abuse by Hamas.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.