Later this month, the Security Council will hold its annual vote about whether to extend the mandate of the United Nations International Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for another twelve months. With a yearly budget of over $500 million—of which the U.S. provides almost a third—UNIFIL’s job is to prevent another war between Israel and Hizballah. This is a mission it cannot accomplish, writes Tony Badran:

In theory, UNIFIL’s mission is to prevent Hizballah from launching attacks against Israel from southern Lebanon, and to ensure the area is free of weapons. In practice, UNIFIL is an expensive charade. Hizballah holds absolute sway in southern Lebanon. And now, just in time for the Security Council’s annual vote, the Lebanese terrorist organization has shown once again that it determines what is permissible for UNIFIL, including whether and how the peacekeepers can monitor the Lebanese-Israeli border, known as the Blue Line.

Controversy over UNIFIL’s surveillance began last year, after the UN secretary general Antonio Guterres issued a report with recommendations to increase the force’s efficiency ahead of last year’s UNIFIL mandate renewal. . . . In defense of its plan, UNIFIL command asserted that it had coordinated with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in deciding to install cameras. As part of its mandate, UNIFIL coordinates closely with the LAF to reassert Beirut’s sovereignty over the border region. The problem is, despite having received billions of dollars in U.S. military assistance, the LAF simply runs interference for Hizballah.

Not surprisingly, UNIFIL soon announced that it had been advised by the LAF not to install the cameras. Something similar, according Badran, occurred when UNIFIL considered using surveillance drones to monitor Hizballah’s activities in the area. Badran concludes:

Two organizations—UNIFIL and the LAF—that successive U.S. administrations have underwritten are at best ineffective and at worst complicit. From the vantage point of the U.S. national interest, the only meaningful policy option is to put an end to the whole farce.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.