In the past few weeks, Houthi rebels backed by Iran have escalated their attacks on Saudi and Emirati positions in Yemen. On September 4, they also launched multiple ballistic-missile and drone attacks on several Aramco facilities within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. removed some of its anti-missile batteries from Saudi Arabia a week later, rendering the kingdom even more vulnerable. The Houthis—who mark every missile and drone launch by chanting their slogan, “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam!”—are part of the network of militias and proxy groups Tehran dubs the “axis of resistance,” which also operate in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. Michael Segall writes:

Iran has turned Yemen into its testing range. . . . The repeated Houthi airstrikes on targets deep in Saudi Arabia as well as ground battles in various areas of Yemen against the Saudi-led [anti-Houthi] coalition, provide Iran with extensive knowledge and operational experience in the use of various weapons. In some cases, members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, as well as members of Lebanese Hizballah, are involved in operating the Houthis’ systems and in training. Iran is also closely monitoring the operation of Saudi air-defense systems supplied by the United States.

[Iran diffuses its know-how] through instructors in various areas and visits by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad operatives to Iran to study the technology and means of production, and to coordinate the smuggling of components for the construction of heavy rockets, missiles, and other weapons. . . . During the May 2021 war in Gaza, several attempts were made by the terrorist organizations to launch Iranian-designed drones into Israeli territory. Iran is constantly working to equip all elements of the axis of resistance with asymmetrical capabilities for striking deep into Israeli territory and the lands of its regional rivals, mainly in the Gulf and Iraq.

In recent years, Iran has been trying to increase the linkage and fine-tune the coordination between the various components of the axis of resistance and improve their military-operational capabilities. According to Iran, the camp will eventually . . . be able . . . to act as one entity during a confrontation with Israel, the United States, or an Arab coalition, whenever Iran decides to do so.

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwak considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.