Israel’s minister of religious affairs has proposed legislation, currently before the Knesset, that would bring an end to the chief rabbinate’s monopoly on kosher supervision—provoking much condemnation from the rabbinate itself. After presenting a brief history of rabbinic oversight of food production, Shlomo Brody argues that the proposed reforms are likely to be salutary:

In the current system, all food, to receive kosher certification, requires a stamp of approval from the chief rabbinate. Under the proposed reform, multiple rabbinic organizations will be allowed to provide nationwide supervision services, with the chief rabbinate serving as a government regulator of these independent bodies.

The chief rabbinate . . . insists that it is best qualified to run the entire field of kosher supervision in the Jewish state. This claim is undermined by the widespread use of costly “supplementary” kosher-supervision certificates issued by private agencies that have greater public trust and by a scathing report issued several years ago by the state comptroller that highlighted inefficiencies and irregularities in the chief rabbinate’s system.

I, for one, hope that the push for reform will greatly improve the system. It remains clear, [regardless of the details of the current debate], that Jewish law certainly does not mandate a centralized body to govern the nation’s kosher-food production.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.