Israel Has Much to Offer the Nations of Africa, and Deserves a Place at Their Table

In July, the Jewish state was granted observer status in the African Union (AU). Since then, a few African nations and a bevy of pro-Palestinian organizations have protested the decision, asserting that it should be postponed until the Israel-Palestinian conflict is resolved. David May argues that there is no reason “why Palestinian recalcitrance should hold Israeli-African relations hostage.” Furthermore, he writes, Israel has much to offer the continent:

Israel has [diplomatic] relations with 46 out of 54 African countries. . . . Israel has [also] been a global leader in the fight against the coronavirus, and the AU stands to benefit tremendously from Israel’s expertise. Israel’s many other contributions to public health in Africa include combating malaria, providing neonatal care, and building health facilities. And an Israeli-designed method for protecting harvests is helping to feed Africa.

MASHAV, Israel’s agency for international development cooperation, has provided Liberia with COVID-19 relief items such as face masks, thermometers, and medical gowns. MASHAV has also helped African countries improve their agricultural capacity. In 2016, the chairperson of the African Union Commission presented Israel’s ambassador to Ethiopia and the deputy head of MASHAV with a plaque recognizing Israel’s work to combat the spread of Ebola in 2014; Israel set up field hospitals and became the largest donor per capita in that health crisis. . . . Israeli water technology can also be a boon for the AU.

Since 2000, Israel has dramatically increased military collaboration with the Horn of Africa countries, particularly Kenya. . . . And Israel has much to offer African countries in the defense sector, particularly in cybersecurity.

Read more at Algemeiner

More about: Africa, Coronavirus, Israel diplomacy, Israeli technology, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Water

To Save Gaza, the U.S. Needs a Strategy to Restrain Iran

Since the outbreak of war on October 7, America has given Israel much support, and also much advice. Seth Cropsey argues that some of that advice hasn’t been especially good:

American demands for “restraint” and a “lighter footprint” provide significant elements of Hamas’s command structure, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 10/7, a far greater chance of surviving and preserving the organization’s capabilities. Its threat will persist to some extent in any case, since it has significant assets in Lebanon and is poised to enter into a full-fledged partnership with Hizballah that would give it access to Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps for recruitment and to Iranian-supported ratlines into Jordan and Syria.

Turning to the aftermath of the war, Cropsey observes that it will take a different kind of involvement for the U.S. to get the outcomes it desires, namely an alternative to Israeli and to Hamas rule in Gaza that comes with buy-in from its Arab allies:

The only way that Gaza can be governed in a sustainable and stable manner is through the participation of Arab states, and in particular the Gulf Arabs, and the only power that can deliver their participation is the United States. A grand bargain is impossible unless the U.S. exerts enough leverage to induce one.

Militarily speaking, the U.S. has shown no desire seriously to curb Iranian power. It has persistently signaled a desire to avoid escalation. . . . The Gulf Arabs understand this. They have no desire to engage in serious strategic dialogue with Washington and Jerusalem over Iran strategy, since Washington does not have an Iran strategy.

Gaza’s fate is a small part of a much broader strategic struggle. Unless this is recognized, any diplomatic master plan will degenerate into a diplomatic parlor game.

Read more at National Review

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy