Dan Schueftan recently received a challenge from a fellow Israeli liberal. “Imagine,” his interlocutor said, “how Israel would behave if human-rights organizations did not exist, or if international groups turned a blind eye,” his implication being that whatever these organizations’ flaws and excesses, they provide an important check on the Jewish state. Nonsense, says Schueftan, and not only because of the moral bankruptcy of such groups as the once-noble Human Rights Watch or the always-corrupt UN Human Rights Council:

An unbiased examination of some of Israel’s most serious human-rights groups indicates that these organizations have not contributed in any major way to addressing human-rights issues. In 1956, after the Kafr Kassem massacre [of Arab villagers unwittingly violating a curfew, by Israeli police who assumed they were doing so intentionally], the shame felt by Israel and the condemnation issued by the government did not come about through local or foreign rights groups or international pressure.

Then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was ousted in 1983 regardless of external pressure after he failed to prevent the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which Christian Lebanese forces slaughtered hundreds of Palestinians. The Shin Bet dismissed its heads in 1984 after two Palestinian bus hijackers were executed by its members. This, too, was not the result of outside pressure.

In these and other crucial moments, Israel’s democracy operated through public opinion, the legislature, the media, and the Knesset, within the framework of checks and balances. None of these prevented—and based on human experience, could not prevent—serious deviations from the conduct demanded of a multicultural society. But they did prove that lessons can be learned, culprits punished, and wrongdoing condemned.

The U.S. general Norman Schwarzkopf was asked during the 1991 Gulf War how he would conduct the war without France. “Going to war without France is like going hunting without an accordion,” he said. The same is true of Israel and the human-rights organization we know today.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.