Last week, Israel and Morocco—which reestablished diplomatic ties last year in the wake of the Abraham Accords—signed a memorandum of understanding on security issues, which is expected to open the door to intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and perhaps arms sales. In Spain, a country that has a complicated and tense relationship with its African neighbor, the media greeted news of the agreement with alarm. Angel Mas argues that such this reaction is deeply misguided:

The government of Spain systematically disdains Israeli concerns regarding issues such as the financing of terrorism, to which Spanish institutions controlled by the parties in the government contribute under the cover of humanitarian aid. Also, Spain has no problem in cultivating the friendship of regimes that openly call for the destruction of the Jewish state—such as Iran, whose vice-chancellor was received by the Spanish government just a few days ago.

Spain is a country with much more economic and political weight than Morocco. According to historical and cultural criteria, it should be a natural partner of Israel in the Western Mediterranean. But the attitude towards Israel of successive Spanish governments, especially the current one, puts obstacles in the road to this alliance.

The prosperity that the agreement between Morocco and Israel will bring could also be an opportunity for Spain. . . . Spain is not interested in a troubled Morocco but in a prosperous one. Such prosperity, in great measure, depends on Madrid.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.