In Iran last week, writes Eyal Zisser, a cyberattack

paralyzed the government system administering fuel subsidies, causing chaos at some 4,300 gas stations across the country. The attack came on the heels of previous cyberattacks in recent months, which shut down vital services and infrastructure in Iran—from disruptions in traffic lights and train services to water and electric supplies.

Although Jerusalem has not taken credit for any of these acts of high-tech sabotage, there is much speculation that it is responsible for them. But, Zisser notes, electronic warfare won’t convince Tehran to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. What, then, can it achieve?

If Israel is indeed behind [these attacks], they can be viewed as an extension of the so-called “war between wars” that the two enemies have been waging for over a decade. This is a cold war that mostly flies under the radar, and is apparently convenient for both parties as it allows them to avoid an all-out confrontation that neither side wants.

The Iranians are not innocent victims. Iranian hackers attack Israel incessantly, occasionally with lethal repercussions. After all, cyber warfare is not a game. It isn’t confined to merely causing traffic jams or even ransomware attacks on hospitals. Cyberattacks can be deadly if they target a county’s drinking water—as we saw last year when Iranian hackers attempted to poison Israel’s water supply—or cause sensitive operating systems and even weapons systems to malfunction, not to mention planes and vehicles in the future.

Israel is clearly superior to Iran in this field. However, as in previous stages of the campaign the two countries have been fighting, the Iranians are learning, improving, and will ultimately find an answer. Case in point, Israel has stopped attacking Iranian oil tankers on their way to Syria, after Iran began attacking Israeli-owned ships near its shores. These cyber games, therefore, will continue on a low flame, but ultimately won’t be the deciding factor in the ongoing tug of war between Jerusalem and Tehran.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.