Last month, Mansour Abbas, the leader of the Israeli-Arab party Ra’am, had an audience with King Abdullah II of Jordan in Amman, although the meeting only became public knowledge this week. Since June, the king has also met with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and President Isaac Herzog, while the two countries’ respective economic ministers met just last week. Ron Ben-Yishai explains what Abdullah stood to gain from his tête-à-tête with Abbas:

Abbas’s visit to Amman could work to strengthen U.S. support of Jordan while the kingdom is in desperate need of economic assistance from Washington and from Jerusalem. . . . But there may [also] be an internal Jordanian political motivation to the public meeting with Abbas. The palace has been facing mounting pressure over Jordan’s economic crisis. Last month’s report that the king had squirreled away $100 million in tax havens while his subjects are struggling to make ends meet has caused him a great embarrassment.

Abdullah’s main opposition comes from Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood; a photo opportunity with Abbas, an Islamist, could help defuse some of that tension. Jordan’s Bedouin tribes, devout Muslims themselves, are the main supporters of the palace but they too have much criticism of the king. The Ra’am party represents many Bedouin tribes in Israel who have family ties to tribes in Jordan; by honoring Abbas, Abdullah could hope to appease some of his critics.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.