Last month, Mansour Abbas, the leader of the Israeli-Arab party Ra’am, had an audience with King Abdullah II of Jordan in Amman, although the meeting only became public knowledge this week. Since June, the king has also met with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and President Isaac Herzog, while the two countries’ respective economic ministers met just last week. Ron Ben-Yishai explains what Abdullah stood to gain from his tête-à-tête with Abbas:

Abbas’s visit to Amman could work to strengthen U.S. support of Jordan while the kingdom is in desperate need of economic assistance from Washington and from Jerusalem. . . . But there may [also] be an internal Jordanian political motivation to the public meeting with Abbas. The palace has been facing mounting pressure over Jordan’s economic crisis. Last month’s report that the king had squirreled away $100 million in tax havens while his subjects are struggling to make ends meet has caused him a great embarrassment.

Abdullah’s main opposition comes from Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood; a photo opportunity with Abbas, an Islamist, could help defuse some of that tension. Jordan’s Bedouin tribes, devout Muslims themselves, are the main supporters of the palace but they too have much criticism of the king. The Ra’am party represents many Bedouin tribes in Israel who have family ties to tribes in Jordan; by honoring Abbas, Abdullah could hope to appease some of his critics.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.