On Monday, the Washington Post reported that the IDF had conducted two airstrikes—on March 5, 2020 and June 8, 2021—targeting Syria’s chemical-weapons program. Jerusalem is thought to have carried out similar attacks in 2018. Besides demonstrating the failure of the 2013 U.S. agreement to have Russia supervise the removal of Damascus’s chemical weapons, the Israeli attacks send a clear message to the world. Yoav Limor writes:

The strikes on secret facilities where the Syrian regime had intended to restart its chemical-weapons manufacturing program had three goals. The first was to keep non-conventional weapons out of Syria’s hands, even if they were only at the initial stages of development. The second was to make clear to the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, that Israel would not allow Syria to go back to threatening it with weapons of mass destruction. And third, to send a message to other countries—primarily Iran—that Israel will take the same course of action against anyone who develops weapons that threaten its existence.

The Washington Post report does not make it clear what the U.S. response was to the strikes, and more pertinently, why the U.S. was not the one to attack after explicitly promising that it would not allow Syria to obtain chemical weapons of any type. It might have to do with Israel beating it to the punch and allegedly carrying out the strikes as part of the operations it allegedly carries out in Syria on a regular basis. . . . It’s also possible that the Americans simply balked at exercising military force—both the Trump administration, which was in power at the time of the first strike, and the Biden administration, which was in power during the second.

By avoiding an attack on these facilities, the Americans again missed an opportunity to send a message to the Middle East and the world as a whole. Israel, on the other hand, stood up for its principles, again.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.