Since the brief war in May—known in Israel as Operation Guardian of the Walls—Hamas has more or less refrained from launching missiles from Gaza, while Jerusalem has eased some of the economic pressure on the territory. Egypt meanwhile has been trying to mediate an arrangement whereby Hamas will release the bodies of two fallen Israeli soldiers, along with the Israeli citizens it is holding hostage. But Hamas has used the six months of quiet to build up its arsenal and to expand its reach, as Kobi Michael explains:
The Hamas leadership in Gaza, which until Guardian of the Walls was focused on Gazan affairs and did not show much interest in the West Bank, . . . adopted a “dual resistance strategy,” which in essence is an effort to maintain security calm in the Gaza Strip alongside a developing and intensive effort to consolidate an infrastructure in the West Bank for terror operations against Israel. . . . [I]n addition to these efforts, the organization—with Iranian help and guidance, and in coordination with Hizballah—is also working to develop its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. Moreover, it is working to foment unrest in eastern Jerusalem and deepen channels of communication with Israel’s Arab citizens.
Hamas’s strategic positioning after the round of fighting in May is better than before. Israel has eased the security closure of the Gaza Strip more than since Hamas took control of Gaza.
Now is the time for Israel to reassess its moves with respect to the organization. It should neutralize the dual resistance strategy and make it clear that it sees Hamas as a single entity, and therefore any terror activity in the West Bank or southern Lebanon will be treated in the same way as terror activity in the Gaza Strip, with some of the responsibility assigned to the Hamas leadership in Gaza, which is no longer trying to hide its involvement in other theaters.
Israel must take the initiative, at a time it deems more strategically convenient rather than at a time imposed by Hamas, and inflict ongoing critical damage to the organization’s military infrastructure in all its theaters—even at the cost of harming the chances of reaching an arrangement.
Read more on Institute for National Security Studies: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-israel