As 90 percent of Israeli imports and exports are shipped by sea, and the country is now engaged in major offshore gas drilling, it is particularly vulnerable to attacks that come by sea, writes Eliezer Marom, the former commander of the Israeli navy:

Hamas in Gaza is constantly consolidating its naval offensive capabilities, using underwater means as well as unmanned vehicles. At the same time, the rocket threat to gas rigs is growing. On the northern front, Hizballah is improving its capabilities to infiltrate the navy’s routine security apparatus as part of its efforts to infiltrate Israel’s northern shores. Moreover, the Iranian-backed Shiite terrorist group is currently in possession of various missiles—some operationally advanced—that pose a threat to Israeli gas rigs as well as to maritime traffic to and from the Jewish state.

Another challenge the Israeli navy is facing is that of protecting the freedom of travel to Israel in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, amid growing attempts to disrupt it.

While no other fleet in the Mediterranean poses an actual threat to navigational freedom, the same cannot be said for the Red Sea. This body of water’s shape, and the fact that six countries in Asia and Africa—Yemen and Saudi Arabia to the east; Egypt to the north and west; Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti to the west; and Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf of Aqaba—dot its shores—means that Israeli shipping could face threats from unstable countries that could become hostile in the event of a war.

Fortunately, as Marom explains, there are steps the IDF can take to make itself better prepared.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.