In 1982, Rabbi Yosef Qafiḥ (sometimes pronounced “Kapaḥ”) was asked to address the Knesset to mark the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the aliyah, or collective migration to the Land of Israel, of Jews from Yemen. Elli Fischer, prefaces his 2015 translation of the speech with a note about Qafiḥ’s life:

Rabbi Qafiḥ (1917-2000) was a Yemenite-born rabbinical judge and scholar of Jewish theology who made aliyah in 1943. Once in Israel, Rabbi Qafiḥ served on the country’s supreme rabbinic court and translated the classics of the Jewish theological tradition—Rabbi Saadya Gaon’s Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, Rabbi Yehudah Halevi’s Kuzari, Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, and more—from Arabic to modern Hebrew. In addition to being an expert in both the Jewish legal and theological traditions, Rabbi Qafiḥ was a daring thinker who didn’t hesitate to attack conventional pieties. This [speech] is a good example of his iconoclasm.

In his address, Qafiḥ challenges the very assumption that the Yemenite aliyah began in 1882:

The concept of “Zionism” has been invoked here several times. In Yemen, this concept did not exist as the name of a movement or a distinct internal group. The Diaspora throughout Yemen was there on a temporary basis. They saw themselves as hotel guests, even though their stay lasted for 2,000 years. Therefore, those individuals and groups who made aliyah to the Land of Israel over time did not deviate from the mainstream. For that reason, these aliyot [i.e., waves of migration] were not noted, in contrast to aliyot from elsewhere. . . . Since the latter [immigrants] went against the pervading spirit of their environments, their aliyah was an extraordinary, wondrous, inspirational thing. . . . In Yemen there was no need for this. Aliyah naturally continued in a normal, organic fashion, because everyone was a candidate; everyone waited for the right moment, for the removal of his particular barriers.

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.