Taking advantage of the changing nature of both media and warfare itself, writes Yaacov Falkov, major powers like Russia and China as well as guerrilla groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda have grown astute at undermining the morale of their enemies. The failure to keep up with such strategies, according to Falkov, might amount to the U.S. military’s greatest weakness—one that can outweigh battlefield superiority. Moreover, he writes, American allies tend to suffer from the same liability, although Israel is working hard to remedy the situation:

Iran is fully aware of the strategic advantages of the ongoing information revolution in military affairs and is devoting growing attention, energy, and resources—as well as intellectual, organizational, and technical efforts—to improve its doctrines and capabilities in the sphere of information warfare. . . . The head of Iran’s National Security Council has recently picked up the habit of tweeting in Hebrew to gain Israeli attention. The influence tools at the Iranians’ disposal are numerous, ranging from the official media platforms, social networks, religious-cultural centers abroad, and unattributed cyberattacks, to covert, semi-covert, or overt violent actions—including terror, commando raids, and drone or missile strikes—performed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and/or its different regional partners.

Multiple violent non-state actors, including the Afghan Taliban, Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Hamas (which in recent rounds of fighting used social networks to sow fear in Israeli society), and, above all, Hizballah, have also fully entered the era of the information revolution in military affairs.

Since the 2006 Lebanon war, the Israel Defense Forces and the intelligence community have recognized the appearance of a new sphere of encounter, beyond that of classical [battlefield] combat—“the battle for consciousness” (ha-ma’aracha al ha-toda’a)—and understood its challenges and advantages. The IDF created a special function for “consciousness operations,” aimed at shaping opinions and attitudes toward Israel’s military actions among enemy forces, other Middle Eastern players, as well as Western and global audiences. Besides official warnings sent to Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran through the Israeli and regional non-Hebrew media channels, constant messaging is directed at the broader international community, including foreign civil and military leaders, diplomats, the press, and the greater public.

Yesterday, the beepers used by hundreds of Hizballah operatives were detonated. Noah Rothman puts this ingenious attack in the context of the overall war between Israel and the Iran-backed terrorist group:

[W]hile the disabling of an untold number of Hizballah operatives is remarkable, it’s also ominous. This week, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant told reporters that the hour is nearing when Israeli forces will have to confront Iran’s cat’s-paw in southern Lebanon directly, in order to return the tens of thousands of Israelis who fled their homes along Lebanon’s border under fire and have not yet been able to return. Today’s operation may be a prelude to the next phase of Israel’s defensive war, a dangerous one in which the IDF will face off against an enemy with tens of thousands of fighters and over 150,000 rockets and missiles trained on Israeli cities.

Seth Frantzman, meanwhile, focuses on the specific damage the pager bombings have likely done to Hizballah:

This will put the men in hospital for a period of time. Some of them can go back to serving Hizballah, but they will not have access to one of their hands. These will most likely be their dominant hand, meaning the hand they’d also use to hold the trigger of a rifle or push the button to launch a missile.

Hizballah has already lost around 450 fighters in its eleven-month confrontation with Israel. This is a significant loss for the group. While Hizballah can replace losses, it doesn’t have an endlessly deep [supply of recruits]. This is not only because it has to invest in training and security ahead of recruitment, but also because it draws its recruits from a narrow spectrum of Lebanese society.

The overall challenge for Hizballah is not just replacing wounded and dead fighters. The group will be challenged to . . . roll out some other way to communicate with its men. The use of pagers may seem archaic, but Hizballah apparently chose to use this system because it assumed the network could not be penetrated. . . . It will also now be concerned about the penetration of its operational security. When groups like Hizballah are in chaos, they are more vulnerable to making mistakes.