Having recently relocated to the Jewish state to serve as president of Jerusalem’s Shalem College, Russell Roberts discusses his experiences as an oleh ḥadash, or new immigrant, with his fellow economist and podcaster Tyler Cowen. Among the topics they cover are media, education, whether the IDF still needs universal conscription, the success of Israeli television, the benefits of ending the government monopoly on kashrut supervision, and why Homer’s Odyssey is the great book most relevant to becoming Israeli. Roberts, an Orthodox Jew, expresses his admiration for the piety of devout Muslims, and for Israel’s “vitality and national pride”—which he fears America lacks. (Audio, 77 minutes. A transcript is available at the link below.)

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.